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INTRODUCTION
In 2004, the California legislature added significantly to
the State Labor Code when it passed the Private Attorney
General Act (PAGA). 1 PAGA was enacted as a response to the
growing disparity between California’s large labor force and
the increasingly finite staff of the state’s enforcement
agencies. 2 The PAGA successfully narrowed this gap by
permitting any aggrieved employee—current or former—to
bring an action on behalf of other similarly situated employees
against their employer for a violation of the California Labor
Code. 3 Essentially, the statute allows employees to step into
the shoes of an attorney general and seek redress because the
1. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2698 (West 2004).
2. See SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1809, at 6
(July 29, 2004).
3. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a) (West 2004). See generally Ben Nicholson,
Business Beware: Chapter 906 Deputizes 17 Million Private Attorneys General to
Enforce the Labor Code, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 581, 583 (2004).
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state is fiscally unable to do so on their behalf. 4
Since its enactment in 2004, 5 “it has become common
practice for plaintiffs in employment actions to assert a PAGA
claim, as the potential civil penalties for violations can be
staggering and often greatly outweigh any actual damages.” 6
Annual PAGA filings have increased over 200 percent in the
last five years, and over 400 percent since 2004. 7 The fact that
PAGA claims cannot be waived by agreements to arbitrate
contributes heavily to the prevalence of these suits. 8 Its
popularity also comes from PAGA’s nature as a representative
action, permitting aggrieved employees to sue on behalf of
other employees; this can often make for a very large group of
employees as plaintiffs, not unlike a class-action suit. 9
4. See SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1809, at 5–
6 (July 29, 2004).
5. The original statute was enacted in 2003 and the amended version in
2004. See Erich Shiners, Chapter 221: A Necessary But Incomplete Revision Of
The Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 877, 882
(2005) (explaining that three new provisions were added in the 2004 amendment,
two were aimed at limiting the potential for frivolous lawsuits under PAGA, and
the other to decrease potentially disproportionate penalty awards).
6. Robyn Ridler Aoyagi & Christopher J Pallanch, The PAGA Problem: The
Unsettled State of PAGA Law Isn’t Good for Anyone, BENDER’S CALIFORNIA
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT BULLETIN, No. 7 July 1, 2013.
7. See Matthew M. Sonne & Kevin P. Jackson, Sheppard Mullin Richter &
Hampton, Towards a “Manageability” Standard in PAGA Discovery, ASS’N OF
BUSINESS TRIAL LAWYERS REP., Vol. XVI, No.3 (Summer 2014).
8. See Iskanian v. CLS Transp., Los Angeles, LLC., 59 Cal. 4th 348, 388–89
(2014) (explaining that because PAGA claims attempt to “vindicate the Labor and
Workforce Development Agency in interest in enforcing the labor code,” such
claims do not interfere with the Federal Arbitration Act, and accordingly, not
subject to waiver through agreements to arbitrate). Class action claims, in
contrast, are subject to waiver through agreements to arbitrate. See AT&T
Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). However, despite Iskanian,
some district courts in California have refused to bar the waiver of PAGA
representative actions. These courts reason that the PAGA waiver issue is one
of federal law and Iskanian is merely a state court’s interpretation of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA). As such, they argue they are not bound by Iskanian, and
conclude that the “rule making PAGA claim waivers unenforceable is preempted
by the FAA.” Fardig v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., No.SACV 14-00561 JVS (ANx),
2014 WL 4782618 at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2014). See also Nanavati v. Adecco
USA, Inc., No. 14-cv-04145-BLF, 2015 WL 1738152 * 6–9, (N.D. Cal. April. 13,
2015) (holding that FAA preempted rule against waiver of PAGA representative
action, and collecting district court cases finding Iskanian persuasive and
unpersuasive).
9. See generally Urbino v. Orkin Services of California, Inc., 726 F.3d 1118,
1121 (9th Cir. 2013) (representative PAGA claim brought with over 800
plaintiffs); Baumann v. Chase Inv. Services Corp., 747 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir.
2014) (representative PAGA claim brought with a class size over 100).
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Indeed, PAGA claims often accompany class-action claims,
and, after Arias v. Superior Court, can be pursued when a class
cannot be established. 10 In that case, the court held that
representative PAGA claims are not subject to the
requirements of California Code of Procedure section 382, 11
California’s class-action statute, because of PAGA’s purpose as
a law enforcement action. 12
Although PAGA actions are not subject to section 382,
PAGA suits are still representative actions in nature and
seemingly parallel the class action model. 13 Due to the
similarities, courts have been wary of encountering class action
problems in PAGA suits and have even dismissed PAGA claims
for grounds normally only associated with class actions, i.e.,
manageability. 14 Manageability was developed as a concept to
assess class actions, but its utilization in PAGA ultimately
prevents concerns inherent in any large representative action:
the adjudication of individualized issues resulting in (1)
numerous hearings on individualized questions of law and fact,
thus wasting scarce judicial resources; or (2) the adoption of
“substantive, procedural, or evidentiary short-cuts around
such hearings.” 15
Even those these concerns exist, not all courts have
recognized the applicability of the manageability concept in
California. 16 As a result, it is unclear whether a plaintiff can
10. Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923 (Cal. 2009)
11. California Code of Civil Procedure section 382 requires three elements:
“[1] the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, [2] a welldefined community of interest, and [3] substantial benefits from certification that
render proceeding as a class action superior to the alternatives.” Brinker
Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021 (Cal. 2012).
12. See id. at 1017 (affirming Court of Appeals judgment that representative
claims under PAGA were not subject to class action requirements). See also
Baumann v. Chase Inv. Services Corp., 747 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.) (“[T]he
California Supreme Court has . . . [held] that PAGA actions are not class actions
under state law. The court found PAGA actions fundamentally different from
class actions, chiefly because the statutory suits are essentially law enforcement
actions”) (citation omitted).
13. Sonne & Jackson, supra note 7.
14. See, e.g., Ortiz v. CVC Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2014
WL 117614, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 19, 2014) (dismissing PAGA claim because
individual issues made the action unmanageable). The presence of individual
issues is part of the community of interest requirement. See supra note 10.
15. Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New Approach
to Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1000 (2005).
16. See Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-01679-ODW(SHx), 2012
WL 4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012) (holding that a finding of
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bring a PAGA claim without fear of it being dismissed as
unmanageable at trial, and on the defendant’s side, whether
they can attack a PAGA action on grounds of manageability.
This uncertainty gives rise to the following question: at what
point, if at all, should a court dismiss a PAGA claim containing
hundreds, or even thousands, of employees with many
individualized questions of fact and law on grounds of
unmanageability? This Comment will explore this question
and assert that notwithstanding the court’s holding in Arias, 17
PAGA claims should necessarily be subject to manageability
limitations, and dismissed when such limitations are
exceeded. 18
Part I of this Comment introduces the historic origins of
PAGA, its legislative history, and its substantive reach and
procedural scope. 19 Additionally, Part I examines the seminal
case, Arias v. Superior Court and class action wage-and-hour
decisions that have implications for similar PAGA claims. 20
Lastly, unmanageability will be introduced, and the dissension
in the California federal courts regarding PAGA, FRCP Rule
23, and unmanageability will be explored. 21 Part II identifies
the problems inherent in failing to control the manageability
of large, complex PAGA actions. 22 Part III analyzes why the
courts have the ability to dismiss PAGA claims as
unmanageable, and why this is the most advisable course. 23
Part IV proposes a useable test in determining if a PAGA
representative action would be unmanageable while litigating
the claim. 24
I. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History
Prior to the enactment of PAGA, the enforcement
departments of the State Labor and Workforce Development
unmanageability because of the presence of individualized questions would
obliterate the purpose of PAGA).
17. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
18. See discussion infra Part IV.
19. See discussion infra Part I.A.-B.
20. See discussion infra Part I.C.
21. See discussion infra Part I.D–E.
22. See discussion infra Part II.
23. See discussion infra Part III.
24. See discussion infra Part IV.
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Agency (LWDA) failed to effectively enforce labor law
violations. 25 This ineffectuality stemmed from the combination
of a growing economy and severe budgetary shortfalls. 26 To
help remedy this problem and crack down on the increasing
number of labor law violations in a growing labor market, the
legislature enacted PAGA; this effectively deputized more than
17 million workers to enforce the labor laws themselves. 27
Simultaneously, PAGA alleviated budgetary problems by
increasing the flow of cash going into labor law enforcement:
the statute provides that 75% of any award be recovered by the
LWDA. 28 The remaining 25% is split among all the similarly
situated employees. 29
PAGA did not come without opponents, however, and this
Comment seeks to address one of the early criticisms made
upon the statue’s enactment: the ability of employees to sue
their employers on behalf of a class without having to fulfill
class certification requirements. 30
Employers also voiced concerns, arguing that PAGA would
disproportionately favor employees and work to the detriment
of already overburdened employers. 31 Specifically, they argued
it was unfair that employee-plaintiffs could recover attorney’s
fees while employers could not. 32 Moreover, they posited the
enactment “adds to an already unfriendly business climate in

25. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796 at 6
(September 10, 2003). One study concluded that at the pace the Division of Labor
Enforcement (DSLE) was investigating labor violations in California restaurants,
it would take over 100 hundred years to inspect each and every restaurant in
California. See Nicholson, supra note 3, at 582.
26. See Nicholson, supra note 3, at 582.
27. See Nicholson, supra note 3 at 582. See also Halliwell v. A-T Solutions,
983 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1182 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (“The California legislature enacted
PAGA to ‘allow aggrieved employees, acting as private attorney generals, to
recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations when the labor law enforcement
agencies could not keep pace with the growth of the labor market’”) (citing Arias
v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.4th 969, 980 (2009)).
28. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(i) (West 2014) (the money is also used for the
education of employers and employees regarding their rights under the labor
code); Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc., 202 Cal. App.4th 1119, 1123 (Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]he
relief [from PAGA] is in large part for the benefit of the general public rather than
the party brining the action.”).
29. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(i) (West 2014).
30. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796 at 7 (Sept.
10, 2003).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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the state by encouraging suits against employers.” 33 Broader
policy implications were also asserted—opponents feared
PAGA litigation and penalties could potentially increase
business costs, thus resulting in an exodus of business to states
with more employer friendly laws. 34
Other concerns included the unnecessary litigation of
claims for minor violations, such as the size of font in an
arbitration agreement, 35and the trial court’s lack of ability to
reduce excessive penalties for such violations. 36 Fortunately
for employers, these two particular concerns of abuse were
quickly curbed as the legislature followed up the original
statute with an Amendment in 2004. 37 The same cannot be
said of the other issues opponents voiced criticism about, and
these concerns have been left to the courts to work out. 38
Specifically, the issues regarding the inapplicability of class
action requirements for PAGA representative suits—asserted
back in 2003—remain, and are the focus of this Comment.
B. Substantive and Procedural Scope of the PAGA
1. The Substantive Reach of the PAGA
The reach of the statute is simple: it allows a private action
to be brought for the violation of numerous labor code
provisions. 39 Penalties may not be awarded for mere technical
violations of the Labor Code, such as any violation of a posting,
notice, agency reporting, or filing requirement. 40 Once an
appropriate provision is sued under, the employee need only

33. See Nicholson, supra note 3 at 585.
34. See Shiners, supra note 5, at 881.
35. See Lenora M. Schloss & Carl A. Cohorn, Assessing the Amended Labor
Code Private Attorneys General Act, 28 LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Feb. 2006, at 13.
36. See Shiners, supra note 5, at 888.
37. See Aoyagi & Pallanch, supra note 6 (explaining that although some steps
have been taken to curb the abuse the opponents feared, “the legislature has left
PAGA to the courts to work out the details of its application in practice.”).
38. Id.
39. The relevant provisions are contained in section 2699.5. See CAL. LAB.
CODE § 2699.5 (West 2014).
40. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(g)(2) (West 2014). See Lenora M. Schloss & Carl
A. Cohorn, Assessing the Amended Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, 28
LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Feb. 2006, at 14 (calling § 2699(g)(2)—which was part of
the PAGA amendment in 2004—the single most important change to PAGA
because it eliminated a provision in the 2003 bill allowing for suits to be brought
for harmless technical violations).
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show that a violation occurred, not that they were actually
harmed by the violation. 41
Additionally, an “aggrieved employee” may bring an action
“on behalf of . . . other current or former employees against
whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” 42
An “aggrieved employee” is defined as a person who was
employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or
more of the alleged violations were committed. 43 But, the
employee cannot bring suit if the LWDA decides to file a suit
covering the same alleged misconduct. 44
Notably, the statute contains no class action
requirements, and, as mentioned above, PAGA representative
actions are not required to meet class action requirements. 45
Thus, PAGA potentially functions as a “back-door” route to a
class action lawsuit, which greatly increases the potential
liability for an employer-defendant. 46
2. Penalties and Attorney’s Fees within PAGA
The remedy provision in the PAGA statute functions as a
default remedy available when no pre-existing civil penalty in
the labor code exists. 47 If the default remedy applies, the civil
penalty is $500 dollars if the person does not employ one or
more employees. 48 If the person employees one or more
employees, the penalty is “one hundred dollars . . . for each
aggrieved employee pay period for the initial violation and two
hundred dollars . . . for each aggrieved employee per pay period

41. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a) (West 2014); Shiners, supra note 5, at 879
(“[T]he act apparently does not require the employees to demonstrate actual
harm.”).
42. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a) (West 2014).
43. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(c) (West 2014).
44. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(h) (West 2014).
45. Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923 (Cal. 2009).
46. See Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 13.
47. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. App. 4th 210, 222
(Ct. App. 2010) (applying PAGA penalty because no statutory penalty existed for
violations of seating requirements in wage order promulgated by the Industrial
Welfare Commission); see also Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2., 163 Cal. App.4th
1157, 1206–07 (Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing that violations of Labor Code § 210—
failure to make payments—are not subject to PAGA default remedy because the
provision provides its own penalty).
48. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(f)(1) (West 2014).
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for each subsequent violation.” 49 The 2004 amendment 50 (SB
1809) added a provision designed to limit excessive liability
imposed: trial courts were given discretion to reduce the civil
penalty amount when “to do otherwise would [result in an
award that is] unfair, arbitrary and oppressive, or
confiscatory.” 51
Another highly contested area of PAGA involves the
provision on attorney’s fees: any employee who succeeds in his
or her action is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs. 52 The attorney collects the full amount of these
fees although the prevailing plaintiff only receives twenty-five
percent of the penalties. 53 The impact of this provision is
further magnified because typical wage and hour cases (the
most common type of PAGA action) 54 routinely generate fees in
excess of $100,000. 55 Thus, there is much incentive for
plaintiff’s attorneys to bring these suits because the attorney’s
fees can be quite large. 56
3. Administrative and Notice Requirements
Before any PAGA action may be brought, certain
administrative remedies must be exhausted. An employee
must first notify his or her employer and the appropriate state
agency of the specific Labor Code violation. 57 The next step

49. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(f)(2) (West 2014). Cf. Cal. Lab. Code § 210(a)(2)
(West 2014) (imposing a $200 dollar penalty for subsequent violations of failing
to make a payment, or any willful or intentional violation, plus 25 percent of the
illegally withheld amount).
50. See Shiners, supra note 5.
51. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(e)(2) (West 2014). See generally ASSEMBLY
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1809, at 5 (June 22, 2004)
(explaining that this new provision was enacted to address the concern that the
previous bill “provided no discretion to reduce penalties under the law and that
significant inadvertent violations could lead to astronomical penalties”).
52. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(g)(1) (West 2014).
53. Shiners, supra note 5, at 890. See generally ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796 (June 26, 2003) (opponents argued
that this provision would lead to frivolous lawsuits with low penalty recoveries
but high attorneys’ fees).
54. See Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 16.
55. See Lippold v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., No. C 10-00421 SI, 2010 WL
1526441, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (collecting cases).
56. See Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 13 (explaining that PAGA has
become known among employers and the defense bar as the “Bounty Hunter
Law”).
57. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3(a)(1) (West 2014).
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depends on the type of labor law violation because there are
three categories of violations and they each have their own
implications. 58 To pursue a violation in the first category,
which includes over 150 provisions specified in section 2699.5,
the employee must notify the LWDA and wait thirty-three
days for that agency to decide if they want to investigate the
claim. 59 If they do not pursue the violation, the employee may
commence a civil action pursuant to section 2699. 60
The second category consists of health and safety
violations contained within the California Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1973. 61 This category does not provide for
private lawsuits; the Department of Occupational Safety and
Health (DOSH) must inspect the workplace and issue a
citation. 62
The last category contains all labor code provisions that do
not fall under the aforementioned categories. 63 To bring a suit
in this category, an employee must first notify the employer
and the LWDA of the suspected violation as well as the legal
theories and facts supporting the violation. 64 Then, the
employer may cure 65 the alleged violation within a thirty-three
day timeframe. If the violation is not cured, the employee can
file a civil action. 66
C. The PAGA–Class Action Nexus
1. Arias v. Superior Court
Prior to Arias, it was clear PAGA actions could be brought
as class actions. 67 However, after Arias, it was clear that

58. Id.
59. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3(a)(2)(A) (West 2014).
60. Id.
61. See Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 14.
62. See Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 14.
63. See Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 14.
64. See Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 14.
65. This “cure provision” was added in the 2004 amendment and will likely
effectively reduce the litigation of less serious Labor Code infractions. Notably,
employers are only allowed three cures per year for the same violation. See
Shiners, supra note 5, at 887.
66. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3(2)(A) (West 2014). If the violation is deemed
cured by the enforcement agency, the employee can appeal that decision to the
LWDA and then the superior court. See generally Schloss and Cohorn, supra note
40, at 15–16.
67. Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923, 930 n.5 (Cal. 2009) (emphasis
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PAGA actions do not need to satisfy the state class action
requirements, which operates as a major benefit for employees
wanting to bring large suits. 68 The court affirmed the lower
court’s holding, which relied on the language of the statute, 69
comparisons of the statutory language within section 17204 of
the Business and Professions Code 70 and section 17203 of the
Unfair Competition Law, 71 and most importantly, the purpose
of a PAGA suit. 72 Additionally, the high court addressed three
of the defendant’s arguments.
The most colorable argument asserted that failing to apply
class action requirements would violate an employer’s right to
due process. 73 Specifically, non-party aggrieved employees
added).
68. Id. at 926. See generally CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 382 (West 2014) (a
person may bring a class action when “the question is one of a common or general
interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court . . . .”); Brinker Restaurant Corp.
v. Superior Court, 273 P.3d 513, 523 (Cal. 2012) (“The party advocating class
treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently
numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits
from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.”);
Fireside Bank v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 4th 1069, 1089 (Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]he
community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant
questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical
of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the
class.”) (citation omitted).
69. The “notwithstanding any other provision of law” language indicates that
PAGA actions could be brought without meeting the class action requirements.
Arias v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 4th 777, 779 (Ct. App. 2007), review
granted and opinion superseded by 209 P.3d 923 (Cal. 2009).
70. The language in the PAGA statute was similar to section 17204, which
permitted representative actions that were not brought as class actions; thus, the
same should be permitted for PAGA actions. See Arias, 209 P.3d at 930.
71. Section 17203 of the UCL explicitly requires that representative actions
brought under that statute comply with the class action statute—section 382 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure. In contrast, the PAGA statute does not
contain such language and, as such, does not require the same elements be met.
See id.
72. The purpose being to “protect the public and penalize the defendant for
past illegal conduct.” Arias v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 4th 779 (Ct. App.
2007) (review granted and opinion superseded by 46 Cal. 4th 969 (2009)). This
indicates that PAGA claims need not be brought as class action.
73. Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923, 932. The other two arguments the
defense asserted were: (1) not requiring the class action elements would lead to
absurd results; and (2) the PAGA legislative history reveals an intent that any
PAGA claim be brought as a class action. The first was dismissed because it was
unsupported by the language of the statute, and the second because it was
unsupported by the legislative history—the committee report comments did not
explicitly refer to class actions. See id. at 930-32.
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would be able to profit from the judgment of a prevailing
plaintiff-employee through the use of collateral estoppel, but
would not be bound following an adverse judgment because
“they were not given notice of the action or afforded any
opportunity to be heard . . . .” 74 Thus, the defendants argued
that a one-way collateral estoppel violated their right to due
process because they would be “bound by the judgment as to
remedies other than civil penalties.” 75 If PAGA is “construed
as requiring representative actions under the act to be brought
as class actions” however, this result would be avoided. 76
The high court concluded that no due process violation was
at stake because of the nature of PAGA actions. 77 The
California Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Kennard,
reasoned that because a PAGA action “is designed to protect
the public, and the potential impact on remedies other than
civil penalties is ancillary to the action’s primary objective, the
one-way operation of collateral estoppel in this limited
situation does not violate the employer’s right to due process of
law.” 78
The implications of this decision are enormous. For one, it
eases the process of bringing a PAGA representative action
compared to a parallel class action. Secondly, by allowing
employees to obtain non-penalty remedies through collateral
estoppel, Arias increased the effect a PAGA representative
action could have on employer liability. 79
2. The Increased Need for PAGA Representative
Actions After Recent California State and Federal
Court Decisions
As stated above, PAGA actions are much less demanding
than class actions after Arias. Still, given the choice, plaintiffs
are better off pursuing a class action claim relative to a PAGA
representative action: PAGA mandates that seventy-five
percent of any civil penalties be distributed to the LWDA,

74. Id. at 934.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 933.
77. Id. at 934.
78. Id. at 934.
79. JUDITH M. KLEIN ET AL., CAL. BUS. LAW DESKBOOK § 16:28 (2014)
(explaining that after, a PAGA representative action can have a substantial
impact beyond PAGA’s statutory civil penalties).
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while plaintiffs and their attorney(s) in a class action receive
the entire amount of any penalty. 80 After a variety of decisions,
however, class claims—and specifically class claims for wage
and hour violations 81—have become more difficult to pursue,
thus increasing the attractiveness of pursuing a PAGA
action. 82
The California Supreme Court decision Brinker
Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 83 held that employers need
to only provide meal breaks, and not police them, “triggering
the need for an individualized inquiry for most meal and rest
break claims . . . .” 84 The more individualized inquiries there
are, the lower the chance of class certification because common
issues of law or fact will not predominate over individual
issues—an important factor in the class action “community of
interest” prong. 85
Duran v. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. 86 similarly made obtaining
class action certification more difficult. There, the court
determined that statistical evidence could not “be used as a
substitute for establishing commonality or for avoiding
individualized determination of individual issue[s] . . . .” 87

80. See Aoyagi & Pallanch, supra note 6 (arguing that because 75% of a
recovery would flow to the LWDA, there is a strong incentive to allocate
settlement proceeds towards class action claims).
81. Wage and hour claims are the most common type of PAGA action. See
Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 16.
82. See Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 16.
83. Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.4th 1004 (Cal. 2012).
84. See Aoyagi & Pallanch, supra note 6; see also Schiller v. David’s Bridal,
Inc., No. 1:10–cv–00616–AWI–SKO, 2012 WL 2117001 (E.D. Cal. 2012)
(explaining that the Brinker decision made class certification for missed meal
breaks more difficult).
85. See Brinker Restaurant Corp., 53 Cal.4th at 1022 (Cal. 2012). The other
two factors in the community of interest prong are “class representatives with
claims or defenses typical of the class . . . and . . . class representatives who can
adequately represent the class.” Id. at 1021.
86. Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn., 59 Cal.4th 1, 50 (Cal. 2014) (remanding
to lower court to determine whether loan officers working for U.S. bank were
misclassified as exempt employees outside salespeople under section 1171 of the
California Labor Code).
87. GUIDE TO MULTISTATE LITIGATION § 2.2 n. 7 (2014) (citing Duran, 325
P.3d at 922). See also Duran, 325 P.3d at 933 (“There must be some glue that
binds class members together apart from statistical evidence.”). Commentators
have noted that this decision will likely result in a more even playing field for
employers contesting certification of employee class actions. Kevin Lilly,
California Supreme Court Stabilizes The Law In State Misclassification Class
Actions, 21 NO. 6 WESTLAW JOURNAL CLASS ACTION 1, 2 (2014).
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Statistical proof is only appropriate if the trial plan can firmly
establish how individual issues can be managed at trial. 88
Thus, without being able to utilize statistical evidence,
plaintiffs will have a more difficult time certifying a class.
In the federal courts, Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Dukes 89 gave bite
to the commonality requirement for Rule 23 and section 382
class certification. 90 The Supreme Court heightened the
commonality requirement by stating a plaintiff must identify
among the class a common injury and common questions
deemed central to the dispute. 91 Additionally, the Court held
that Trial By Formula technique is not a permissible method
for determining individualized damages. 92 The unavailability
of this technique provides further incentive for Plaintiff’s to
forgo costly and difficult means of obtaining class certification,
and, instead, focus on a PAGA claim.
These cases have made obtaining class action certification
more difficult in California state court and federal court, and
consequently increased the attractiveness of PAGA claims. 93

88. See Duran, 325 P.3d at 933–34.
89. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011).
90. See id. at 2551. In federal court, the commonality requirement is
distinct from the predominance requirement. In California state court, the
predominance requirement is an element within the commonality prong.
Compare 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1763 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the
differences between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(3), the
predominance requirement, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a)(2),
the common issues of fact and law requirement), with Duran, 325 P.3d at 930–31
(explaining that a plaintiff must show common issues of fact predominate as part
of the community of interest prong).
91. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2551 (2011). The “centrality” principle has been
applied in California state court. See, e.g., Williams v. Superior Court 221
Cal.App.4th 1353, 1368 (2013) (applying Dukes and holding that the common
issues must be central to the dispute).
For an argument criticizing the Dukes requirement of “centrality,” see A.
Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access
to Justice, 93. B.U. L.REV. 441 (2013).
92. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2561. The Trial By Formula technique permits
individualized claims to be resolved through sample cases extrapolated to the
claims of the entire remaining class; thus, it makes class claims more manageable
by obviating the need for extensive individualized inquiry. Id.
93. See also Comcast Corporation v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013)
(explaining that a plaintiff needs to be prepared to prove the requirements of Rule
23(a), it is not merely a pleading standard, also, the Court found that plaintiff’s
expert evidence, in and of itself, cannot satisfy predominance under FRCP Rule
23(b)(3)); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U.L. REV. 729
(2013) (arguing that in recent years, courts have made it more difficult for
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Unsurprisingly, California plaintiffs will most likely pursue
PAGA claims instead of class actions in the future. 94 The
decisions also are relevant for PAGA because these principles
are useful when assessing the manageability of the actions. 95
D. PAGA In The Federal Courts
1. Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 Apply to
PAGA Claims Within Federal Court?
As was made clear in Arias, California Code of Civil
Procedure section 382 does not apply to PAGA claims in
California state court. 96 However, the holding did not settle
whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 applies to PAGA in
California federal courts. The answer is crucial. If answered
in the affirmative, Arias will be unable to assist a Plaintiff
seeking to bring a PAGA representative action that typically
would be denied as a class action.
Additionally, with the emergence of the Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA), all class actions exceeding $5 million
must be brought in federal court. 97 Many class action claims
are joined with PAGA claims; 98 thus, if the class claim is
removed to federal court, the PAGA claim will be too. This
increases the importance of the Rule 23 inquiry. 99
The answer to this question, however, is decidedly mixed
and brings much uncertainty for both PAGA plaintiffs and
defendants in a federal court action. The courts finding that
Rule 23 does apply to PAGA representative actions follow the
reasoning of Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v.

plaintiffs to bring class action lawsuits).
94. Aoyagi & Pallanch, supra note 6.
95. See Ortiz v. CVC Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2014 WL
117614, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 19,2014) (citing Duran when discussing the
availability of statistical evidence to establish liability for the PAGA claim).
96. Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 926.
97. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2) (West 2014).
98. See Aoyagi & Pallanch, supra note 6 (explaining that “PAGA claims have
tended to ride the coattails of traditional class action claims”).
99. The PAGA claim follows because of the doctrine of supplemental
jurisdiction. See 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567 (3d ed. 2010) (“Supplemental
jurisdiction can be justified only if the supplemental claim is so closely related to
the jurisdiction-invoking claim that they are part of the same case or
controversy,” which is satisfied if they share a common nucleus of operative fact)
(citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).
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Allstate Ins. Co. 100 There, the United States Supreme Court
decided that because Rule 23 regulates procedure, it
automatically applies in all civil actions in the district courts
“regardless of its incidental effect upon state-created rights.” 101
As such, plaintiffs must still meet the requirement of Rule 23
when there is a state statute regulating procedure. 102
Following this analysis, a minority of California district courts
have determined that because PAGA permits recovery for
unnamed parties, it is essentially a procedural mechanism “by
which litigants may recover for absent plaintiffs, akin to a class
action,” and thus, Rule 23 applies. 103
The majority of California federal courts have reached the
opposite conclusion. 104 These courts distinguish PAGA as a
procedural mechanism by reasoning that its purpose as a
public protecting, law-enforcement statute transcends its
procedural character. 105 Moreover, PAGA does not confer a
private benefit onto the plaintiff and the represented
employees—the benefit falls upon the public. 106
Further support for Rule 23’s non-applicability is found in
the recent 9th Circuit decision Baumann v. Chase Inv. Services

100. Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 599 U.S.
393 (2010) (addressing the interplay between a New York statute limiting the
availability of relief under class actions and Rule 23).
101. Id. at 1444.
102. Id.
103. Fields v. QSP, Inc., No. CV 12-1238 CAS (PJWx), 2012 WL 2049528, at
*5 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2012); see also Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756,
AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 993, 943 (2009) (holding that PAGA does
not create any property rights or other substantive rights, it is simply a
procedural statute permitting an aggrieved employee to recover statutory
penalties); Thompson v. APM Terminals Pacific Ltd., No. C10-00677 JSW, 2010
WL 6309364, at *2 (N.D. Cal. August 26, 2010) (PAGA claim in federal court must
meet requirements of Rule 23); Ivey v. Apogen Technologies, No. 11CV366 DMS
NLS, 2011 WL 3515936, at *3 (S.D. Cal. August 10, 2011) (explaining that
because section 2699(a) provides for the recovery of unnamed parties, it
contravenes federal procedural requirements and Rule 23 applies).
104. See, e.g., Villalpando v. Exel Direct Inc., No. 12-cv-04137 JCS, 2014 WL
1338297, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014).
105. Id.
106. Sample v. Big Lot Stores, Inc., No. C10-03276 SBA, 2010 WL 4939992,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2010); see also McKenzie v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 765
F.Supp.2d 1222, 1234 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that Rule 23 does not apply to
Class Actions and that this view is consistent with Arias); Cardenas v. McLane
Foodservice, Inc., No. SACV 10-473 DOC (FFMx), 2011 WL 379413, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 31, 2011).
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Corp. 107 The 9th Circuit reasoned that because Rule 23 and
PAGA are more dissimilar than alike, PAGA claims could not
establish federal court jurisdiction under CAFA. 108 At least
one lower court has interpreted this holding as resolving the
question of whether Rule 23 applies to PAGA representative
actions. 109
This split creates undesirable uncertainty in the law for
parties—but
mainly
employers—litigating
a
PAGA
representative action. 110 Nonetheless, Rule 23 most likely will
not apply to PAGA in Federal District Court, significantly
easing the burden for plaintiffs in bringing their
representative actions. However, there is still one lingering
concept—well established in class action jurisprudence—that
still poses an issue in PAGA cases: unmanageability.
E. Unmanageability and its Role in PAGA Suits
1. What Is Unmanageability?
There exists a “commonly accepted rule of class actions: if
the [action] is ‘unmanageable,’ it should be dismissed.” 111
Courts look towards manageability to assess whether a court
can fairly and efficiently conduct a trial, or whether its
magnitude and complexity prevent a fair adjudication. 112 It
“ultimately involves a judgment concerning the usefulness of
the expenditure of judicial resources entailed in the litigation

107. Baumann v. Chase Inv. Services Corp., 747 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2014).
108. Id. at 1124 (9th Cir. 2014).
109. Villalpando v. Exel Direct Inc., No. 12-cv-04137 JCS, 2014 WL 1338297,
at *20 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014). But see Ortiz v. CVC Caremark Corporation, No.
C-12-05859 EDL, 2014 WL 117614, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 19,2014) (recognizing
that Baumann supports the distinction between PAGA and Rule 23 class actions,
but does not decide the issue); Halliwell v. A-T Solutions, 2014 WL 4472724, at
*3 (S.D. Cal Sep. 10, 2014).
110. TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL S. ARNOW-RICHMAN & CHARLES A.
SULLIVAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS xxx (2d
ed. 2011) (discussing the issues that stem from uncertainty in the law for
employers).
111. Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 755, 761 (Cal. 1976)
(Mosk, J., dissenting). In federal court, one of the considerations in determining
whether class certification is appropriate is possible difficulties in managing a
class suit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D) (West 2014).
112. In re LifeUSA Holding Inc., 242 F.3d 136, 148 (3d Cir. 2001) (vacating
and remanding lower court’s order granting class certification because common
issues did not predominate over individual ones, making the class
unmanageable).
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of a class action . . . .” 113
Manageability has often been subsumed in the
predominance class action requirement, which requires that
common issues of fact and law predominate over individual
issues. 114 Manageability can also be a consideration in other
elements as well. 115 Unmanageability “may be reflected by
such matters as the size or contentiousness of the class . . . or
the presence of special individual issues.” 116 If enough
evidence of unmanageability is found, the court denies class
certification because going forward with the claim would
transform the litigation into an enormous burden on the court’s
resources, unable to be effectively managed or controlled. 117
Unlike in federal court—where manageability is explicitly
mentioned in Rule 23—section 382 says nothing of
manageability. 118 Nonetheless, the concept of manageability is

113. Note, Developments in the Law—Class Action: Fundamental
Requirements for Class Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1454, 1499 (1976). See also Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 164 (1974) (explaining that manageability
“encompasses the whole range of practical problems that may render the class
action format inappropriate for a particular suit.”).
114. See Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn., 325 P.3d 916, 930–31 (Cal. 2014)
(explaining that assessing the manageability of litigating individual issues is
connected to the predominance inquiry, which is part of the community of interest
prong); 7AA CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1780 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the
manageability consideration and its ability to help the court “in determining
whether questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate . . . .”).
115. A leading treatise considers the manageability inquiry as part of the
superiority requirement. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE &
HERBERT B. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:72 (5th ed. 2011) (explaining that
manageability is the most critical concern “in determining whether a class action
is a superior means of adjudication”). It has also been considered part of the
ascertainability requirement. See, e.g., Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v.
Superior Court, 113 Cal. App. 4th 836, 849 (Ct. App. 2003) (“Manageability . . . is
intertwined . . . with the question of ascertainability . . . ”) (quoting Reyes v.
Board of Supervisors, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1263, 1275 (1987)).
116. 7AA CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1780 (3d ed. 2010). See also 1 WILLIAM B.
RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:72
(5th ed. 2011) (“[T]he cases most likely to be unmanageable are those involving
myriad individual issues . . . .”).
117. In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 91–92 (9th Cir. 1972)
(reversing class certification because of unmanageability due to the
predominance of individual questions, high administrative costs, and
complexity).
118. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D) (West 2014) (stating that in
assessing the predominance of common issues of law and fact with individual
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firmly rooted in California case law; it was first recognized in
Diamond v. General Motors Corp. 119 In Diamond, class
certification was denied because the proceeding would be
unmanageable due to many individualized issues. 120 Shortly
after, another unmanageable class action was dismissed when
the community of interest requirement was not met. 121
The California Supreme Court first dismissed a class
action as unmanageable in Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior
Court. 122 The court weighed the potential of plaintiff’s
recovery—which was insubstantial—with the expensive
administrative costs in identifying and processing claims. 123
Finding that substantial benefits did not accrue to the litigants
and the court alike, the court dismissed the action as
unmanageable. 124 The court did not dismiss for the presence
of individual issues like the two previous cases; instead, the
court intertwined manageability with weighing the burdens
and benefits of the class action. 125 Notably, this manageability
weighing assessment has been considered a factor distinct
from the other more traditional requirements. 126
Since PAGA representative actions are not subject to class
action certification, the manageability assessment is gaining
popularity because it concerns judicial economy and the
efficiency of actions. 127 As the next section details, considering
issues of law and fact, the court should look at “the likely difficulties in managing
the class), with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 2014).
119. Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 377–78 (Ct. App.
1971).
120. Id. (denying class certification, in part, because there were many
individualized issues).
121. Devidian v. Automotive Service Dealers Assn., 35 Cal. App. 3d. 978, 985
(1973) (holding that there was no manageable community of interest).
122. Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 755, 758-59 (Cal. 1976).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See RUTTER GROUP, CAL. PRAC. GUIDE CIV. PRO. BEFORE TRIAL Ch. 14B 14:17.8 (2014) (identifying the weighing assessment as an “other factor”
germane to class certification); see also Reyes v. San Diego County Bd. of
Supervisors, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1263, 1275 (Ct. App. 1987) (considering the
manageability inquiry as part of ascertainability but also—and distinctly—an
underlying admonishment of the Supreme Court to “weigh the respective benefits
and burdens of a class action . . . .”).
127. See e.g., Ortiz v. CVC Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2014
WL 117614, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 19, 2014) (dismissing PAGA action as
unmanageable because too many individualized assessments would be needed at
trial).
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manageability is proper because courts are have inherent
power to control their dockets when judicial economy is
implicated.
2. A Court’s Ability to Control Its Docket
Connected to the manageability issue is a court’s “inherent
power to control [its] dockets.” 128 It has been long recognized
that California courts “have inherent equity, supervisory, and
administrative powers, as well as inherent power to control
litigation before them.” 129 With this power, the courts are
permitted to “[fashion] new forms of procedures when required
to deal with the rights of the parties and manage the caseload
of the court.” 130 These powers comport with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which are to be administered in order to
secure “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action.” 131
Due to the complexity and size accompanying PAGA
actions, the potential to clog up the courts with PAGA actions
is large. Thus, the court’s inherent power to control its docket
becomes paramount. 132 Some courts have begun to utilize
these inherent powers, and assess manageability when faced
with complex PAGA claims. 133
3. Unmanageability in Action: PAGA Suits in
Federal Court
Notwithstanding the California Supreme Court’s holding
that PAGA suits are fundamentally different than a class

128. Thompson v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831
(9th Cir. 1986). See generally Sonne & Jackson, supra note 7, at 7 (arguing that
the courts inherent power to control its docket is connected to manageability).
129. Cottle v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1367, 1377 (Ct. App. 1992).
130. Id.; see also Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal.
App. 3d 272, 287 (Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing that these powers are “‘derived from
the historic power of equity courts’ and ‘supervisory or administrative powers
which all courts possess to enable them to carry out their duties’”) (quoting
Bauguess v. Paine, 22 Cal. 3d 626, 635 (1978)).
131. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also Defendants’ Motion To Strike Any Class,
Collective, or Representative Actions or Claims at 21, Litty v. Merrill Lynch &
Co. Inc, 2014 WL 5904904, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014) (No. CV. 14-0425 PA
(PJWx) (arguing that dismissing unmanageable PAGA representative action
secures the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the present action,
while not obliterating the purpose of PAGA).
132. See Sonne & Jackson, supra note 7.
133. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
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action 134—and
thus
not
subject
to
class
action
requirements 135—courts have been willing to dismiss PAGA
claims for lack of manageability. 136 Other courts, however,
reach the opposite conclusion and are unwilling to dismiss for
unmanageability, reasoning it would obliterate PAGA’s
purpose to “incentivize private parties to recover civil penalties
for the government that otherwise may not have been assessed
and collected by overburdened state enforcement agencies.” 137
These cases are discussed below.
In Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corp., an extremely large PAGA
representative action, 138 the court determined the Plaintiff did
not need to satisfy the class action requirements of Rule 23. 139
Nonetheless, the court found that the PAGA claim was
unmanageable because it required too many individualized
assessments. 140 The court noted that manageability issues
were magnified in this wage and hour case because the
plaintiffs had not shifted the burden to the defendant to
counter liability. The result would have been to require the
plaintiff to demonstrate liability as to thousands of individual
aggrieved employees. 141
The same result was reached in Litty v. Merrill Lynch,
where the court granted a motion to strike the plaintiff’s PAGA
134. Baumann v. Chase Inv. Services Corp., 747 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.
2014).
135. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL , 2014
WL 117614, at *4 (N.D. Cal. March 19, 2014) (“[T]he Court does not conclude that
PAGA claims are unmanageable in general, but only that the circumstances of
this case make the PAGA claim here unmanageable because a multitude of
individualized assessments would be necessary.”).
137. Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-01679-ODW(SHx), 2012 WL
4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012).
138. The case involved thousands of employees in over 850 stores. See
Defendants’ Motion to Strike PAGA Representative Actions Allegations at 13,
Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corp., 2014 WL 117614, at *4 (N.D. Cal. March 19,2014)
(No. CV 12-05859 EDL).
139. Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corp., 2014 WL 117614, at *1 (N.D. Cal. March
19,2014). See supra notes 76–85 and accompanying text.
140. Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2014 WL 117614, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. March 19, 2014). The action involved claims for compensation for
off-the-clock work, unreimbursed mileage, and under-reimbursed mileage, all of
which would require highly individualized questions. Id. at *4–5.
141. Id. Cf. Alcantar v. Hobart Service, No. ED CV 11-1600 PSG (SPx), 2013
WL 146323, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan 14. 2013) (highly individualized, fact-intensive,
mini-trials not likely because the burden was on the Defendants to prove “that
they kept adequate records of meal breaks or relieved employees of their duties”).
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representative action for wage and hour claims. 142 After
initially rejecting class certification because individualized
issues predominated, the court determined “[t]he
circumstances of this case make the PAGA claim
unmanageable because a multitude of individualized
assessments would be necessary.” 143 Interestingly, in both
cases, the courts applied Arias. 144 Nonetheless, both judges
still dismissed the claims as unmanageable because of
numerous individualized issues of fact and law: a result
commonly reached when rejecting class action certification. 145
Importantly, recent cases have continued to rely on Litty
& Ortiz. 146 These courts have similarly held that PAGA
representative actions are unmanageable when there are a
large number of allegedly aggrieved individuals who would
require a multitude of individual assessments to prove
liability. 147
142. Litty v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc, No. CV 14–0425 PA (PJWx), 2014 WL
5904904, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014). This case, like Ortiz, would have
involved the individualized inquiries of thousands of employees. See Defendants’
Motion To Strike Any Class, Collective, or Representative Actions or Claims at
21, Litty v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc, No. CV. 14-0425 PA (PJWx), 2014 WL
5904904, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014).
143. Litty v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., No. CV 14-0425 PA (PJWx), 2014 WL
5904904, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014).
144. See Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. C–12–05859 EDL, 2014 WL
117614, at *2 (N.D. Cal. March 19, 2014) (recognizing that PAGA actions do not
need to meet class action requirements in state court and federal court after
Arias); Litty v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc, CV 14-0425 PA (PJWx), 2014 WL
5904904, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014) (dismissing for unmanageability even if
the Arias holding applies to PAGA representative actions in federal court).
145. See, e.g., Elliot v. ITT Corp., 150 F.R.D. 569, 585–86 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(denying class certification in a Truth in Lending Act claim because the number
of individual fact issues would make the litigation unmanageable); In re Fosamax
Products Liability Litigation, 248 F.R.D. 389, 403–04 (S.D. N.Y. 2008) (denying
class certification on products liability claim because the amount of individual
questions would make the action unmanageable).
146. See Raphael v. Tesoro Refining and Marketing Co. LLC, No. 2:15-cv02862-ODW, 2015 WL 5680310, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 25, 2015)(holding that
PAGA claim was unmanageable and inappropriate because “[t]he Court would
have to engage in a multitude of individualized inquiries. . . .”); Amey v.
Cinemark USA Inc., No. 13-cv-05669-WHO, 2015 WL 2251504, at *16–18 (N.D.
Cal. May 13, 2015)(dismissing PAGA claim when it would require “too great a
number of individualized assessments. . . .”); Bowers v. First Student Inc, Inc.,
No.2:14-CV-8866-ODW (Ex), 2015 WL 1862914, at *4 (C.D. Cal. April 23, 2015)
(striking PAGA representative claim because it involved a multitude of
individualized assessments).
147. Amey v. Cinemark USA Inc., No. 13-cv-05669-WHO, 2015 WL 2251504,
at *16–17 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2015); Bowers v. First Student Inc., No.2:14-CV-
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Lastly, in Rix v. Lockheed Martin Corp. a PAGA group
consisting of eighty-eight employees alleged fifteen separate
Labor Code violations as to each employee, thus confronting
the court with over 1,000 alleged Labor Code violations. 148 The
court ultimately dismissed the PAGA action because it was not
persuaded the plaintiff could establish the claims with common
proof—a class action necessity. 149 Although the court did not
explicitly dismiss the claim for lack of manageability, that
conclusion is commonly reached when questions of fact and
law, capable of common proof, do not exist. 150
These cases illustrate courts are willing to dismiss a PAGA
action if the suit would be unmanageable, which is a class
action concept. However, because Arias seemingly dictates
otherwise, it is no surprise that there are cases, such as
Plaisted v. Dress Barns, which have concluded that striking or
dismissing a PAGA suit as unmanageable is inappropriate. 151
In reaching its conclusion, the Plaisted court addressed
the defendant’s contentions regarding the unmanageability of
the PAGA claim. 152 The defendant asserted that “courts
regularly decline to allow ‘representative actions’ to proceed
where
the
claims
require
individualized
factual
determinations, and individualized calculation of damages
that are more than nominal amounts.” 153
In addressing the first contention, the court recognized
that PAGA’s purpose is to incentivize employees to sue
employers for labor violations and recover penalties for the
government. 154 This purpose would be obliterated if a PAGA
action could not be maintained due to individual assessments

8866-ODW (Ex), 2015 WL 1862914, at *4 (C.D. Cal. April 23, 2015)
148. Rix v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 09cv2063-CAB (NLS), 2013 WL
9988381, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2013).
149. Rix v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 09cv2063-CAB (NLS), 2013 WL
9988381, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2013). “The need for common proof dovetails
with the Rule 23 requirements of commonality and predominance.” Marlo v.
United Parcel Services, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 476, 484 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
150. See, e.g., Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 335 (3d. Cir
2011)(“A key question in a litigation class action is manageability—how the case
can and will be tried, and whether there are questions of fact or law that are
capable of common proof”) (emphasis added).
151. Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-01679-ODW(SHx) 2012 WL
4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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because “every PAGA action in some way requires some
individualized assessment regarding whether a Labor Code
violation has occurred.” 155 The court was not persuaded by the
second argument involving calculations because the cases the
defendant relied upon involved individualized restitution
calculations under California’s Unfair Competition Law
(UCL).
Restitution calculations, unlike the calculations
needed
here,
are
extremely
fact-intensive
and
individualized. 156 In contrast, violating PAGA results in the
recovery of statutory penalties in fixed amounts. 157 Therefore,
the manageability problems inherent in a UCL case were not
present in the PAGA claim here, and the defendant’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings was denied. 158
Another case that failed to strike a potentially
unmanageable claim was Echavez v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co.
Inc. 159 In addressing the defendants’ manageability argument,
the court recognized the plaintiff would have difficulty
establishing liability, which would be required for each
individual she was seeking to recover on behalf of. 160 In similar
fashion to the Plaisted decision, the court held that this was
not a reason to strike a claim. 161
All in all, the defendants in each of the above-mentioned
cases expressed a similar concern: the difficulty and
subsequent unmanageability in proving individual issues for
many employees at trial. However, different results ensued.
Ortiz even cited the Plaisted statement regarding the
obliteration of the purpose of PAGA and still reached a
different result. 162

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-01679-ODW(SHx) 2012 WL
4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012).
158. Id. at *2–3.
159. Echavez v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. Inc., No. CV 11-9754 GAF (PJWx),
2013 WL 7162011, at *10–11 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
160. Id.
161. Id. at *11. (The court approvingly cited Plaisted for the proposition that
PAGA’s purpose would be obliterated if a court ruled that a case was
unmanageable because of individual assessments).
162. Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corporation, 2014 WL 117614, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
March 19, 2014) (“To hold that a PAGA action could not be maintained because
the individual assessments regarding whether a violation had occurred would
make the claim unmanageable at trial would obliterate [PAGA’s] purpose, as
every PAGA action . . . requires some individualized assessment . . . .”) (quoting
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This dissension within California district courts creates a
shroud of uncertainty for parties in a PAGA representative
action. Such “uncertainty in the law can inflict real costs on
employers, not only ex-post (litigation expenses and
unexpected liabilities) but also ex-ante (in terms of risk
aversion and investments in planning and compliance).” 163
What’s more, the ex-post costs augment in PAGA cases because
they are lengthy, complex suits, 164 and progress further into
litigation than a parallel class action that would have already
been dismissed for failing to meet typical class action
requirements. These costs also have an impact on the
likelihood of a settlement in a PAGA action. 165
4. The Unmanageability of PAGA Actions In State
Court and the Implications of Unmanageable
Cases
These federal court decisions also have implications for
PAGA representative actions in California state court. While
not binding, unpublished federal court decisions are still
persuasive authority in state court. 166 One of the beforementioned cases (Plaisted) was recently cited in an opinion
where the defendant argued the unmanageability of a PAGA
claim. 167 The case was the unpublished decision, 168 Nelson v.
Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., 2012 WL 4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012)).
163. TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL S. ARNOW-RICHMAN & CHARLES A.
SULLIVAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS xxx (2d
ed. 2011).
164. See, e.g., Driscoll v. Granite Rock Co., No. 1-08-CV-103426, 2011 WL
10366147, Cal. Super. Ct. September 20, 2011) (adjudicating PAGA action, where
trial lasted fourteen days and involved 285 exhibits and fifty-five witnesses,
which included an expert witness using statistical evidence to prove who was an
aggrieved employee).
165. See Peter Toll Hoffman, Valuation of Cases For Settlement: Theory and
Practice, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 22 (1991) (discussing how litigation expenses,
inter alia, influence the size and likelihood of a settlement). For how these costs
influence PAGA actions and increase the chance of coercive settlements, see infra
Part IV.B.1.
166. Olinick v. BMG Entertainment, 138 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1301 n.11 (Ct.
App. 2006).
167. See Nelson v. Southern California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL
3008663, at *18–19 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013) (relying on Plaisted when
reversing the lower court’s holding).
168. Although unpublished, and noncitable, see CAL. R. CT. 8.1115(a), this
case is still important because it relied on the Plaisted analysis. As such, it
indicates that California courts are willing to follow the federal courts in their
analysis on this nascent issue.
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Southern California Gas Company. 169 There, a Court of Appeal
affirmed the lower court’s denial of class certification, but
reversed its concurrent denial of PAGA representative status
on the basis of unmanageability; the lower court reached this
conclusion because individual issues predominated. 170
The Nelson court stated that after Arias, it was anomalous
that the trial court could deny PAGA representative status
when individual issues predominated. 171 The Nelson court also
relied heavily on Plaisted’s analysis regarding the
inapplicability of manageability concerns within a PAGA
action. 172 The absence of any other court dismissing a PAGA
claim for unmanageability also influenced the judge’s
conclusion. 173
Following the court’s decision, the defendant’s submitted
a petition for rehearing174 to the Supreme Court of California
and an amicus letter in support of petition for review. 175
Although review was denied, these materials set forth: (1) why
manageability can still be assessed in light of Arias; and (2) the
potential for abuse stemming from disregarding the
manageability problem in PAGA actions. 176
The petitioner’s key point is that Arias said nothing about
manageability; the court merely held that certifying a class as
mandated by Civil Procedure Code section 382 was not
required. 177 For example, while a defendant should not be
permitted to contest the inadequacy of a representative, 178 the
169. Nelson v. Southern California Gas Company, (No. B238845), 2013 WL
3008663 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013).
170. Id. at *19 (reversing the lower court’s decision which held that the
individual issues predominated, thus making the case unmanageable).
171. Id. at *16.
172. Id. at *18.
173. Id.
174. See Respondent’s Petition for Rehearing, Nelson v. Southern California
Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at *19 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10,
2013).
175. See Brief for CELC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Nelson v.
Southern California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at *19 (Cal.
App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013).
176. See Brief for CELC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at *3–6,
Nelson v. Southern California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at
*19 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013).
177. See Respondent’s Petition for Rehearing, at *2, Nelson v. Southern
California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at *19 (Cal. App. 2
Dist. June 10, 2013).
178. See generally 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY
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presence of numerous individual issues based on extensive
records of declarations and depositions should not prevent the
court from rendering a PAGA group trial unmanageable. 179 In
other words, “Arias . . . did not hold that an unmanageable
case becomes triable simply because counsel affixes the label
‘PAGA’ to it.” 180
The argument in the Amicus letter struck a different vein:
it focused on the negative implications that would result if
courts ignored manageability in PAGA suits. 181 For one, strike
suits 182 leading to “blackmail” settlements will be encouraged
if a case must proceed to summary judgment and/or trial
regardless of unmanageable individualized issues. 183 That is,
a defendant would rather settle than continue litigating the
expensive claim. 184
The possibility of a meritless claim leading to a settlement
increases in PAGA actions for two reasons: (1) they are
commonly joined with class actions; and (2) PAGA contains a
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1765 (3d ed. 2010) (“[T]he adequacy
of representation requirement is . . . of critical importance in all class actions and
the court is under an obligation to pay careful attention to the . . . prerequisite in
every case.”).
179. See Respondent’s Petition for Rehearing, at *2, Nelson v. Southern
California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at *19 (Cal. App. 2
Dist. June 10, 2013).
180. See Respondent’s Petition for Rehearing, at *9–10, Nelson v. Southern
California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at *19 (Cal. App. 2
Dist. June 10, 2013).
181. See Brief for CELC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at *3–5,
Nelson v. Southern California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at
*19 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013).
182. “A strike suit is defined as litigation, usually based on no valid claim,
brought either for nuisance value or to obtain a settlement.” Joshua D. Fulop,
Agency Costs and The Strike Suit: Reducing Frivolous Litigation Through
Empowerment of Shareholders, 7 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 213, 215 (2007) (quoting Erica
Beecher-Monas, Enron, Epistemology, and Accountability: Regulating in a Global
Economy, 37 IND. L. REV. 141, 177 n.202)).
183. See Brief for CELC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at *2,
Nelson v. Southern California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at
*19 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013).
184. A “blackmail” settlement is a settlement in which “the defendant is
bludgeoned into settling cases for more than they are worth.” Bruce Hay & David
Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality
and Remedy, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1377, 1378 (2000). See also Milton Handler,
The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—The
Twenty Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971) (“Any
device which is workable only because it utilizes the threat of unmanageable and
expensive litigation to compel settlement is not a rule of procedure—it is a form
of legalized blackmail.”).
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penalty scheme allowing for a large amount of liability to be
imposed. 185 The Amicus letter provides an illustrative example
of a strike suit in the PAGA context: there are 10,000
employees in an action that, after four years, proceeds to trial;
assuming that a violation is found and not fixed, the PAGA
penalty of $200 per week is triggered; for one employee, a
potential recovery of more than $40,000 would amount; this
sum is then multiplied by 10,000 employees, and, the employer
now faces a litigation risk of $400 million. 186 Faced with this
risk and litigation expense, a settlement for a bargain rate will
look attractive.
Another issue involves the terms of the settlement. With
the class action claim still joined, the defense will settle the
majority of the proceeds towards that claim—with the
plaintiff’s attorney receiving one third of the amount—while
the PAGA claim will be dropped or settled for a nominal
amount. Plaintiffs will favor settling towards the class claim
because those settlement funds are not allocated towards the
State of California. 187
To prevent these strike suits, the Amicus letter proposes a
solution: “If at the time of class certification (and following
adequate discovery) the trial court concludes that individual
issues predominate, rendering unmanageable any group-wide
determination of alleged Labor Code violations, the trial court
in the exercise of discretion . . . can deny representative
status.” 188 The remainder of this article explains why reaching
this conclusion is necessary in PAGA representative actions.

185. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(f)(2) (West 2014). Subsection(f)(2) provides
for a civil penalty of $100 for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the
initial violation and $200 for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each
subsequent violation. The “per pay period” scheme allows PAGA civil penalties to
accrue up until trial.
186. See Brief for CELC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at *3–4,
Nelson v. Southern California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at
*19 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013).
187. Brief for CELC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at *3–4, Nelson
v. Southern California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at *19
(Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013). See also Aoyagi & Pallanch, supra note 6
(arguing that there is incentive to settle towards the class claim).
188. Brief for CELC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at *5, Nelson
v. Southern California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at *19
(Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013).
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II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The current state of PAGA representative actions leaves
much uncertainty and liability for employers litigating any one
of the numerous Labor Code violations in which PAGA
applies. 189 The uncertainty stems from the inconsistent
application of: (1) Rule 23 to PAGA claims; and, more
importantly, (2) the Arias court’s holding that PAGA
representative actions do not need to meet class action
requirements. These two concerns dovetail into one mass of
confusion for employers regarding what they must do to obtain
a dismissal of a large—and potentially unmanageable—PAGA
representative action.
While at least two California district courts would hold
that class action-sized PAGA groups are unsusceptible to the
manageability concerns, 190 others are beginning to recognize
the inherent manageability problems with PAGA claims, and
thus, the undesirability of a trial on such claims. 191 However,
without guidance from the California Supreme Court or the
9th Circuit, California’s lower courts will continue to draw
upon class action concepts to dismiss PAGA representative
claims, which seemingly conflicts with Arias. Alternatively, if
Arias is rigidly followed, the possibility of “blackmail”
settlements through the use of strike suits remains. Therefore,
it is up to the courts, or legislature, to clarify the limits of Arias,
and articulate a test that can correctly identify the point in
which a court must dismiss an unmanageable PAGA action.
III. ANALYSIS
A. It is Permissible for California Courts to Dismiss
PAGA Representative Actions as Unmanageable
1. Dismissing a PAGA Suit as Unmanageable Does
Not Conflict With Arias v. Superior Court
Arias held that in a PAGA representative action, a
Plaintiff does not need to satisfy the requirements of California
Code of Civil Procedure section 382. 192 This is not equivalent

189.
190.
191.
192.

See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 150–62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 135–48 and accompanying text.
Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923, 935 n.5 (Cal. 2009).
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to holding that PAGA plaintiff’s do not need to satisfy any type
of inquiry associated with class actions—i.e., manageability.
Notably, Arias did not mention manageability once in its
opinion. 193
The early California class action cases dismissing for lack
of manageability do not appear to consider it a requirement. 194
It is a distinct conclusion reached upon failing to satisfy the
other concrete requirements of section 382: community of
interest, ascertainable class, and superiority. The applicability
of the manageability inquiry to each of these prongs 195 also
supports the conclusion that it is not a traditional
“requirement” falling within the purview of the Arias
holding. 196 Lastly, Blue Chips dismissed an unmanageable
class action using a balancing test that is arguably
unconnected to the traditional elements of section 382. 197
These cases, in conjunction with the Arias opinion failing to
mention manageability once, give rise to an inference that
Arias did not intend to relieve plaintiffs of establishing a
manageable class exists.
Further, Section 382 of California’s Code of Civil
Procedure fails to make any mention of manageability as a
requirement; this is in contrast to Rule 23 and the statutes
from thirty other states, which include manageability in their
provisions. 198 This absence also supports the conclusion that
manageability is not a strict requirement of §382, but instead,
a consideration in all class actions, and an available option
193. See Arias, 209 P.3d 923 (Cal. 2009).
194. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
196. See Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301,
1304–305 (9th Cir. 1990) (considering the manageability in notifying class
members of the suit, which is part of the “ascertainable class” requirement);
Dunbar v. Albertson’s, Inc., 141 Cal. App. 4th 1422, 1432 (Ct. App. 2006)
(considering the manageability in determining individualized issues of liability,
as part of the predominance requirement); 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA
CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:72 (5th ed. 2011)
(explaining that “[manageability] is the most critical concern in determining
whether a class action is a superior means of adjudication.”).
197. See Reyes v. San Diego County Bd. of Supervisors, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1263,
1274 (Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that the Blue Chips weighing of class actions
benefits and burdens is not just a requirement, but an underlying admonishment
by the supreme court).
198. See Erbsen, supra note 15, at 1056–57 and nn. 118–21 (examining all of
the states class action statutes and noting that California is in the minority of
states that has not adopted a manageability rule in its statute).
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when other requirements are not satisfied. 199 Dismissing
PAGA actions for lack of manageability should not be in
conflict with Arias’ admonishment that a Plaintiff does not
meet class certification requirements.
2. The Court Has The Inherent Ability to Dismiss
Unmanageable PAGA Claims
The court’s ability to manage its docket becomes important
when dealing with PAGA claims because the strict class action
requirements do not apply, and because of the little amount of
case law related to the proper treatment of PAGA cases. 200
Thus, the fundamental principles mentioned in Cottle v.
Superior Court are important in preventing a PAGA action
from becoming a back door to a class action case—and
eventually a class settlement. 201 Indeed, cases such as Ortiz,
Litty and Rix—and their dismissal of the PAGA claims for
unmanageability—illustrate that courts have discretion to
create workable solutions when faced with cases threatening
the manageability of their docket. 202
Although these three cases were in federal court, the
inherent ability of courts to manage their caseload, as stated
Those
in Cottle, extends to California state court. 203
fundamental principles should apply to potentially
unmanageable cases. To fail to do so would ultimately result
in burdening the trial court’s resources with complex and
expensive litigation. 204
3. Federal District Courts in California Are
Instructive on the Issue of Manageability and
Should be Followed in California State Court
Even if the manageability assessment is not considered

199. See supra notes 114–18.
200. Sonne & Jackson, supra note 7, at 7.
201. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. See also Sonne &
Jackson, supra note 7, at 7.
202. See, e.g., Ortiz v. CVC Caremark Corporation, No. 2-12-05859 EDL, 2014
WL 117614, *at 3 (N.D. Cal. March 19,2014) (dismissing PAGA claim as
unmanageable because multitude of individualized assessments would be
necessary).
203. See Cottle v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1367, 1377 (Ct. App. 1992)
(“California courts have fashioned new forms of procedure when required . . . to
manage the caseload of the court.”) (emphasis added).
204. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
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exempt from Arias’ holding, and the court’s inherent power to
dismiss for PAGA actions is unpersuasive, dismissing a
resource draining PAGA action is still advisable.
Although unpublished, Ortiz, Rix and Litty are persuasive
authority in California state court. 205 The only cases going the
other way were Echavez & Plaisted, with the latter stating: “To
hold that a PAGA action could not be maintained because the
individual assessments regarding whether a violation had
occurred would make the claim unmanageable at trial would
obliterate [PAGA’s] purpose, as every action requires some
individualized assessment . . . .” 206
The difference in result may be explained by
distinguishable facts and the procedural posture of Plaisted. 207
The Plaisted plaintiff not only failed to file a class action, but
also failed to provide the court with a complete evidentiary
record. 208 Conversely, in Ortiz and Litty the court had
previously ruled that the plaintiff was unable to prove her class
claims with common proof, and that individualized
assessments were required to determine liability as to every
other employee in the representative group. 209
As such, the absence of a detailed record evidencing the
numerous individualized assessments—which were necessary
to determine liability—may explain the Plaisted court’s
reluctance to dismiss the PAGA claim because of

205. Olinick v. BMG Entertainment, 138 Cal. App. 4th 1286, 1301, fn.11 (Ct.
App. 2006).
206. Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-01679-ODW(SHX), 2012 WL
4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012).
207. See Defendants’ Motion To Strike Any Class, Collective, or
Representative Actions or Claims at 21, Litty v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc, No. CV
14–0425 PA (PJWx), 2014 WL 5904904, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014) (No. CV.
14-0425 PA (PJWx).
208. See Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-01679-ODW(SHX), 2012
WL 4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012) (“Plaisted failed to seek class
certification within Local Rule 23-3’s 90-day deadline . . . .”).
209. Compare Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL,2013
WL 6326743, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013) (denying class certification because
there would be many individualized determinations of thousands of employees),
and Litty v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., No. CV 14–0425 PA (PJWx), 2014 WL
5904907, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2014) (denying class certification because “the
record demonstrates that the variation in how and where the [employees] perform
their primary duties is fatal to commonality”), with Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc.,
No. 2:12-CV-01679-ODW(SHX), 2012 WL 4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20,
2012) (“Plaintiff Alexis Plaisted’s deadline to file a motion for class
certification . . . has expired.”).
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manageability. 210 Had the court obtained such a record, the
case may have gone the other way because the
unmanageability of the Plaisted individual assessments would
have been somewhat comparable to the Ortiz and Litty cases. 211
Further, the only California state court decision at odds
with Ortiz, Rix, and Litty is Nelson v. Southern California Gas
Company, which is unpublished. It has no authority and is
uncitable. 212 Nonetheless, the case is important because it
illustrates that State courts are willing to follow district courts
on the manageability issue.
Nelson relied heavily on Plaisted, but, as mentioned above,
Plaisted may have come out differently had a record capable of
adequately establishing the manageability problems been
available. 213 Moreover, Nelson noted the absence of any case
“specifically considering whether the trial court may deny a
representative PAGA claim on the ground that individual
questions would make the litigation unmanageable.”
However, with Ortiz and the multitude of other cases following
Ortiz, this is no longer true. Had those correctly decided cases
been available, Nelson may have gone the other way as well.

210. See Defendants’ Motion To Strike Any Class, Collective, or
Representative Actions or Claims at 21, Litty v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc, No. CV.
14-0425 PA (PJWx), 2014 WL 5904904, at *19–20 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014)
(“Plaisted might well have been decided differently if, as here and in Ortiz, the
court had already ruled that the plaintiff could not prove her class claims with
common proof, and that individualized inquiries were necessary . . . .”).
211. Compare Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment at 21–23, Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No.
2:12-CV-01679-ODW(SHX), 2012 WL 4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012)
(arguing that the individualized inquiries needed in this case would create
manageability problems because up to several hundred managers would have to
testify at trial to determine who was an “aggrieved employee”), with Ortiz v. CVS
Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2013 WL 6326743, at *11 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 2, 2013) (dismissing PAGA action because individualized assessments
would have been necessary for thousands of employees, in order to determine who
suffered labor code violations, and thus, was an aggrieved employee).
212. CAL. R. CT. 8.1115(a) (West 2014).
213. See supra notes 207–211 and accompanying text.
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B. The Prudential Concerns that would Result if Courts
Could not Dismiss for Lack of Manageability
1. The Danger of Strike Suits and “Blackmail”
Settlements
The strike suit 214 becomes a threat in PAGA actions
because plaintiffs can avoid the rigors of class action
requirements.
PAGA’s exemption allows complex
representative actions to advance through the court system far
longer than a normal class action— accruing litigation
expenses all along the way. 215 This creates an incentive 216 for
employers to settle even in the face of a potentially meritless
claim. 217 Simply put, the potential risk of litigating a complex
and large action, involving thousands of employees with many
individualized issues, becomes undesirable. This is especially
true with a PAGA case where penalties can accrue up to the
point of trial.
In addition to litigation expenses, the presence (or
absence) of insurance coverage plays a unique role in the strike
suit or “blackmail” settlement. The common form of employer
insurance, Employers Practice Liability Insurance (EPLI),
generally does not cover wage-based claims and claims for fines
and penalties. 218 Since PAGA assesses penalties and covers
many wage and hour statutes, EPLI coverage will not extend
to almost all the claims brought under PAGA. 219
The unavailability of insurance necessarily puts
additional risk on the employer because they may be
personally liable, and simultaneously compels a potentially
unmeritorious settlement. 220 The chance of settlement may
also increase because the uninsured defendant is less
214. See supra note 182 for the definition of a “strike suit.”
215. See Hoffman, supra note 165, at 22 (1991) (litigation expenses are a type
of transaction costs and include: attorney’s fees, filing fees, deposition costs, and
witness fees).
216. See id. (explaining why litigation expenses is a factor taken into account
before settling).
217. Settling a unmeritorious claim for a less than its worth is defined as a
“blackmail settlement.” See generally Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 184 at 1378.
218. Marc B. Heath, Employers Practice Liability Insurance: A Practical
Guide, 25-DEC Vt. B.J. 51, 52 (1999) (discussing what EPLI does not cover).
219. See Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(f)(2) (West 2014).
220. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of
Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319,
371–72 (1991).
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experienced than a claim adjuster—who would otherwise be
handling the case for an insured—and more likely to negotiate
unpredictably, i.e., be “unduly pessimistic, excessively
cautious, [and] anxious to avoid trial.” 221 Therefore, the
unavailability of insurance for PAGA actions can have the
deleterious effect of inducing a settlement for far more than it
is worth.
The coercive settlement concept is well developed in the
class action. 222 In what has been termed the “blackmail”
settlement by commentators, the plaintiffs recover more than
they should, “because the class counsel is able to threaten the
defendant with a costly and risky trial.” 223 The “blackmail”
thesis has been endorsed in the federal courts, with one Court
of Appeals noting that it forces “defendants to stake their
companies on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by
fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal
liability.” 224
The possibility of a “blackmail” settlement looms even
larger in PAGA actions because plaintiffs are not constricted
by class action requirements, which could otherwise derail a
large settlement. 225 For example, not having to meet the

221. Id.
222. See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 184 at 1377.
223. Id. at 1378. See generally Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class
Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1357, 1360–63 (arguing that there
are four different versions of the blackmail thesis, one contends that blackmail
occurs because of the undesirable expenses of litigation, while the other three
posit that these settlements occur because of the consequences of trying the action
(i.e., bankrupting the defendant)).
224. Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1307–08 (7th Cir.
1995) See also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015–16 (“[T]he
suit is exceedingly unlikely to be tried . . . . The case [is] so unwieldy, and the
stakes so large, that settlement becomes almost inevitable—and at a price that
reflects the risk of a catastrophic judgment as much as, if not more than, the
actual merit of the claims.”) (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, J.) (emphasis added).
225. Once a class is certified, the risk-averse defendant is more likely to settle
unfavorably because liability is determined by a lone jury in an all-or-nothing
verdict. The plaintiff bringing a PAGA claim, however, need not worry about
class certification; thus, the risk-averse defendant is even more likely to settle,
and settle earlier, because failure to meet the traditional requirements wont
result in dismissing the suit. See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 184 at 1391
(“[C]ertification makes trial very risky for the defendant . . . .”). If a PAGA claim
and a class action claim are brought together, blackmail settlements with the
proceeds going towards the class claim are more likely in California state court.
There, the plaintiffs need not pass class certification. In federal court, however,
class certification must be met before a settlement can be approved. See supra
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predominance of common issues of law and fact requirement
increases the chance that there will be costly individualized
assessments. The threat of expensive litigation, combined
with the unavailability of insurance, will compel settlement for
many employers and can work as a type of “legalized
blackmail.” 226 However, courts can take the sting out of these
threats if they start to consider manageability in every PAGA
action, ultimately decreasing the chance of blackmail
settlements. 227
2. Purpose of PAGA May Be Undermined
The legislature enacted PAGA with one purpose: adequate
enforcement of the Labor Code through incentivizing private
parties to recover civil penalties by the government. 228 Still,
the LWDA continues to be the primary enforcement agency
and must be adequately staffed and funded to enforce
violations worthy of their attention. To accomplish this, the
legislature included a provision that allows the state to recover
seventy five percent of the statutory civil penalties, while the
aggrieved party only receives twenty-five percent. 229
In enacting PAGA the legislature explicitly recognized the
fiscal effect that PAGA would have: “increased penalty revenue
to the General Fund and the LWDA.” 230 The recovery of civil
penalties was much needed in California because “enforcement
staff for state labor law agencies has fallen drastically behind
the growth in the labor” market and “the budget picture is

note 187.
226. See Handler, supra note 184 at 9.
227. A plaintiff’s attorney will no longer be able to threaten the possibility of
numerous mini-trials and individualized assessments that would drain the
defendant’s resources. Of course, a plaintiff will incur expenses as well with
unmanageable actions but the one-way fee-shifting provision eases the burden on
the plaintiff. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(g)(1) (West 2014).
228. Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No:2-12-CV-01679-ODW (SHx), 2013 WL
1441997, at *2 (C.D. Cal. April 8, 2013).
229. The Ninth Circuit has held that in PAGA actions, the State of California
is the real party in interest. Urbino v. Orkin Services of California, Inc., 726 F.3d
1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013). The 75% is to be used in the “education of employers
and employees about the rights and responsibilities” under the code, and for the
enforcement of labor laws. Courts have said that “[t]he relief available is in large
part for the benefit of the general public rather than the party brining the action.”
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
230. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at
2 (August 20, 2003).
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getting worse, not better.” 231 The LWDA’s recovery of Civil
Penalties effectuates the purpose of PAGA through the direct
enforcement of the Labor Code and in the education of the laws
more generally. Unfortunately, when plaintiffs pursue a
PAGA strike suit as a back-door to a traditional class action
settlement, both of these goals are undermined.
This subversion results because a typical PAGA class
action lawsuit settles most of its proceeds towards the class
action claim, while directing a nominal amount towards the
PAGA claim, assuming it is not dropped altogether prior to
settlement. 232 There is a large incentive to accomplish this
because the plaintiffs no longer have to allocate 75% towards
the state. While the plaintiffs and their attorneys benefit
financially from this, the state emerges as the loser because
the LWDA’s ability to educate and enforce remains
unsupported. The bottom line: inadequate allocations in
PAGA-class action settlements undermine the entire reason
PAGA is exempt from class action requirements—its
fundamentally different purpose as an enforcement action
designed to protect the public. 233
As mentioned above, settling a representative action
becomes attractive to a defendant because of the transaction
costs associated with litigating, and possibly losing, a large
representative action. Permitting large settlements in PAGA
actions with little money actually going towards PAGA 234 is not
appropriate when PAGA’s enforcement purpose is
substantially undermined.
Injecting a manageability assessment into PAGA actions
does not negatively impact PAGA’s role as an enforcement
action; instead, it draws a line for when an action susceptible
to coercive behavior can no longer continue in the courts. It
seems apposite that such an inquiry be applicable when the
very reason PAGA claims are not subject to such requirements
is substantially undermined. 235
231. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at
4 (June 22, 2004).
232. See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
234. This will only be the case when settlement is reached prior to class action
certification. If class certification is not granted, there will be no class action
claim to divert settlement funds into.
235. See Baumann v. Chase Inv. Services Corp., 747 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.)
(“[T]he California Supreme Court has . . . [held] that PAGA actions are not class
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Purposely settling towards the class claim is not just an
undesirable possibility; it is a common occurrence in PAGA
case law and the disparity in allocation is staggering. 236
Recognizing these allocations as askew, some courts have
denied such settlements. 237 Others have found these small
PAGA settlements reasonable, while not recognizing that it
may be the high transaction costs—inherent in a PAGA suit—
forcing the defense to settle. 238
3. A Manageability Assessment Can Save Judicial
Resources
Pursuing a class action suit greatly conserves judicial
resources because numerous plaintiffs are able to consolidate
otherwise disparate claims into a single suit. 239 Class actions
also vindicate the rights of small claimants that could not
otherwise bring suit because of the expense of litigation. 240 As
mentioned before, courts have denied class action certification
where individual issues predominate over common issues,
stating that such situations would not further judicial
Specifically, individual issues give rise to
economy. 241
actions under state law. The court found PAGA actions fundamentally different
from class actions, chiefly because the statutory suits are essentially law
enforcement actions.”).
236. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc., No. 1:10–CV–0324 AWI SKO,
2012 WL 5364575, at *2–3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012) (approving settlement for
$3.7 million with $10,000 allocated towards PAGA); Reed v. Thousand Oaks
Toyota, No. 56-2012-00419282-CU-OE-VTA, 2013 WL 8118716 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
April 8, 2013) (class action settlement approved for $108,624, with $1,500
allocated towards PAGA penalties); Bolton v. U.S. Nursing Corp., No. C 12–4466
LB, 2013 WL 5700403 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2013) (approving class action
settlement for $1,700,000, with $15,000 allocated towards PAGA).
237. Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No: 2-12-CV-01679-ODW (SHx), 2013 WL
1441997, at *2 (C.D. Cal. April 8, 2013).
238. See Franco v. Ruiz Food Products, Inc., No. 1:10–cv–02354–SKO, 2012
WL 5941801 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2012) (holding $10,000, out of $2,500,000, PAGA
settlement reasonable and citing cases reaching similar results).
239. See Erbsen, supra note 15, at 999.
240. Justice Lewis Kaplan, a reporter to the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when Rule 23 was amended, pinpointed two
purposes behind the class action device: “promoting judicial efficiency and
vindicating the rights of small claimants.” Federal Courts—Rules of Civil
Procedure—In a Class Action, Absent Members of the Class are not Parties Subject
to Counterclaims Under Rule 13, 87 HARV. L. REV. 470, 474 n.23 (1973) (citing
Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, in The Class Action—A Symposium, 10 B.C. IND. &
COM. L. REV. 497 (1969).
241. 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1780.1 (3d ed. 2010) (citing Begley v.
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burdensome individual mini-trials, which result in “a
diminution of judicial resources, and thus a reduction in
judicial efficiency.” 242
The fundamental concern for judicial efficiency should not
vanish merely because PAGA is a law enforcement action
diametrically distinct from a class action. 243 This is especially
true when PAGA claims permit one-sided collateral estoppel, 244
a component of the doctrine of res judicata, resulting in an
additional waste of judicial resources. 245 For example, a
defense verdict at trial would achieve little judicial economy
because nonparty employees would still be able to bring claims
against the defendant. While the Supreme Court of California
found the one-way operation permissible because PAGA is
designed to protect the public, its effects must be considered in
tandem with the other judicial efficiency concerns likely to
occur in unmanageable PAGA cases. 246 Properly assessed, the
one-way operation functions as an additional, unnecessary
burden on the efficiency of the courts.
In sum, PAGA’s role as a law enforcement action—a
purpose distinct from traditional class actions—should not
permit waste of judicial resources; 247 both are procedural
mechanisms designed to consolidate actions and achieve what
individual suits cannot. The fact that PAGA claims are
Academy Life Ins. Co., 200 F.R.D. 489 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
242. Arch v. American Tobacco Co., Inc., 175 F.R.D. 469, 495 (E.D. Penn.
1997). See also Dubose v. City of Morristown, No. 2:07-CV-115, 2007 WL 3125280
(E.D. Tenn. 2007) (holding that “conducting mini-trials would be disastrously
wasteful of judicial resources . . . .”).
243. See supra note 235.
244. Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923, 934 (Cal. 2009) (holding that
nonparty employees, but not employers, may invoke collateral estoppel, and “use
the judgment against the employer to obtain remedies other than civil penalties
for the same Labor Code violations.”).
245. See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Products Liability
Litigation, 209 F.R.D. 323, 349-50 (S.D. N.Y. 2002) (explaining that the one-sided
res judicata effect in this case “leads to the conclusion that class treatment of
these claims would not be an efficient use of judicial resources”).
246. See, e.g., Ortiz v. CVC Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2014
WL 117614, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 19,2014) (dismissing suit because of the
unmanageability in trying the many individualized assessments).
247. See Reyes v. Macy’s Inc., 202 Cal. App. 4th 1119, 1123 (Ct. App. 2011)
(“The purpose of PAGA is not to recover damages or restitution, but to create a
means of deputizing citizens as private attorney generals to enforce the Labor
Code.”); Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 197 Cal. App. 4th 489, 499 (Ct. App. 2011)
(distinguishing PAGA actions and class actions because only the latter’s primary
objective is to provide restitution).
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consolidated to enforce the Labor Code for the good of the
general public, and class actions to vindicate the rights of small
claimants, 248 should not allow litigation of the former when
scarce judicial resources would be used inefficiently.
IV. PROPOSAL
The federal courts in California are split on the
applicability of the manageability analysis. 249 An increasing
amount of courts conclude that manageability needs to be
considered and a court should dismiss a PAGA suit when a
trial would become too complex. 250 In contrast, at least two
have determined that the difficulty in proving individual
issues in a representative action—involving many
employees—is not a reason to dismiss or strike a PAGA claim.
At least one California State Appellate Court has followed the
latter view. Because of this dissension, parties are left
uncertain in a situation where there is much at stake,
especially for the employer.
A. California Courts Should Apply a Manageability
Analysis to PAGA Representative Actions
Courts assigned to a large PAGA representative action
consisting of hundreds, or thousands, of employees should
apply a manageability analysis predicated on California class
action case law. In line with Litty and Ortiz, the threshold
inquiry should consider the presence of individualized issues,
and how difficult it would be to establish those issues at trial. 251
Once that is done, courts should look to the California Supreme

248. See San Antonio Tel. Co., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.R.D. 435,
441 (W.D. Tex. 1975) (“Rule 23 was originally designed to protect small or
relatively small claimants . . . .”).
249. See supra Part I.E.3.
250. See supra Part I.E.3.
251. As this article has discussed, the manageability inquiry is part of
multiple class action requirements: superiority, ascertainability, and community
of interest—i.e., predominant common questions of law and fact. This comment
proposes the community of interest prong as the correct framework for analyzing
manageability for three reasons: (1) the federal court decisions have started to
dismiss PAGA suits because of unmanageable individualized inquiry; (2) this
inquiry is the one most likely to cause unmanageability problems in PAGA wage
and hour claims; and (3) some of the other requirements, such as ascertainability,
are not as relevant for PAGA because the employees are more easily identifiable,
thus, limiting the administrative expenses.
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Court’s Blue Chip decision. 252
The court said that
manageability should be assessed by weighing the “respective
benefits and burdens and to allow maintenance of the [suit]
only where substantial benefits accrue to both litigants and the
courts.” 253
If after weighing the benefits and burdens of trying the
individual issues the court determines a complex and
burdensome trial would result—wasting scarce judicial
resources and draining the funds of both litigants in the
process—the court should dismiss the case as unmanageable.
The factors utilized used to weigh the problems individual
assessments would create should include: (1) who has the
burden of proof; (2) whether statistical sampling would be
permissible; 254 and (3) the number of employees represented in
the action. 255
The applicability of the Blue Chip articulation is apt for
PAGA representative actions because it is not a class action
certification requirement mandated by statute. Instead, it is
an “underlying admonishment the Supreme Court has given
the trial courts” 256 that can be utilized to drive at the heart of
what manageability seeks to prevent: a representative action

252. Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 755 (Cal. 1976).
253. Id. at 758.
254. See Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn., 325 P.3d 916, 30–31 (Cal. 2014)
(“Statistical methods cannot entirely substitute for common proof . . . . There
must be some glue that binds class members together apart from statistical
evidence.”).
255. The Ortiz court took into account all three of these factors. See Ortiz v.
CVC Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2014 WL 117614, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. March 19,2014) (striking PAGA claim because burden of proof was on the
defendant, statistical sampling would not have been appropriate, and there were
many employees represented, thus all of these factors made the case more
difficult to try).
256. Reyes v. San Diego County Bd. of Supervisors, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1263,
1274 (Ct. App. 1987). The Reyes and Blue Chip courts considered the articulation
relevant when dealing with ascertainability and the administration costs of
establishing the existence and identification of class members. This issue is not
relevant for PAGA actions because all of the members are employees and easily
identifiable.
However, other courts have considered the admonishment
applicable to class action certification in general, not only in regards to
ascertainability, see Davis-Miller v. Automobile Club of Southern California, 201
Cal. App. 4th 106, 115 n.6 (Ct. App. 2011) (discussing the weighing of burdens
and benefits outside of the ascertainability requirement, and stating that it is
something the party seeking class certification must demonstrate in order to
establish manageability). See also Pinnacle Holdings, Inc. v. Simon, 31 Cal. App.
4th 1430, 1435 (Ct. App. 1995).
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that is not worth the time, effort, and money of the courts and
the parties.
Moreover, when courts dismiss for unmanageability in
this instance, it is not because a PAGA plaintiff has failed to
show individual questions predominate over common
questions of fact and law requirement. It will be dismissed
because the burdens that would result from litigating such
individual questions outweigh the benefits that would accrue
to the parties and the court. The result: Arias’ holding that
PAGA suits should not be subject to class action requirements
is left intact.
A manageability assessment also prevents the likelihood
of strike suits and blackmail settlements. 257 Looking at the
burdens and benefits resulting from a multitude of individual
issues will expose complex suits that could not be conducted
fairly and efficiently at trial. Additionally, if settlement occurs
before class certification, most of the proceeds from PAGA
claims may be allocated towards class claims. The LWDA’s
funding may decrease marginally, but the conservation of
judicial resources that results from dismissing expensive,
unmanageable PAGA actions will far outweigh what the
LWDA would have recovered from strike suits and blackmail
settlements.
CONCLUSION
PAGA was enacted as a unique and creative solution to a
labor enforcement problem in California. 258 It is correctly
considered different from a class action and, accordingly,
should not be treated the same. However, this cannot mean
that absolutely no class action inquiries should be assessed.
The manageability assessment is one of these inquiries
that must be considered. Simply put, the burdens that result
from not considering the concept are too great to go ignored. 259
With the application of this proposed assessment to both state
and federal courts, PAGA will still operate as an effective law
enforcement action designed to benefit the public; nothing in

257. See supra Part III.B.1.
258. See supra Part I.A.
259. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the prudential concerns
implicated when ignoring manageability—i.e., “blackmail” settlements and waste
of judicial resources.
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considering manageability changes this. But in addition, the
assessment will work to negate (1) “blackmail” settlements, (2)
inefficient litigation through unduly complex suits, the waste
of judicial resources, 260 and, (3) uncertainty in the law.
In sum, without legislature explicitly imposing a
manageability requirement in PAGA actions, the Blue Chip
weighing test is an appropriate solution to remedy the beforementioned concerns. Some courts are already on the right
track, 261 but a developed test will expeditiously prevent the
clog in the judicial system PAGA suits can create. This test
will help encourage the filing of PAGA suits that are the most
meritorious and deserving of justice, while alleviating many
concerns in the process.

260. See supra Part III.B.
261. See e.g., Ortiz v. CVC Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2014
WL 117614, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 19,2014).

